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the population of elderly Americans is  expanding so rapidly
 
that in the next half-century the number of seniors in the United States is expected
to increase by 
 
137
 
%. The population of Americans with disabilities is also growing,
and the number of people requiring long-term care is expected to more than double
before 
 
2050
 
 (DHHS and DOL 
 
2003
 
). In California the number of persons aged
sixty-
 
W
 
ve and over is expected to increase 
 
22.7
 
% between 
 
2000
 
 and 
 
2010
 
 (California
Budget Project 
 
2004
 
), and the overall rate at which the elderly are living with one or
more disabilities is rising quickly (Heinritz-Canterbury 
 
2002
 
). As a result, Califor-
nia, like the nation as a whole, is experiencing a growing demand for long-term care.
Yet, during the next twenty years, the demographic group from which caregivers are
generally drawn, women between the ages of thirty-
 
W
 
ve and 
 
W
 
fty-
 
W
 
ve, is expected to
increase by only 
 
9
 
% nationwide (GAO 
 
2001
 
).
Demand for in-home care in particular is also on the rise, and California is facing
a critical shortage of home care workers. Seniors are often isolated or distant from
family members who might provide care, and, in
 
X
 
uenced by the scandals surround-
ing the nursing home industry, many are reluctant to seek care in institutional settings
(Heinritz-Canterbury 
 
2002
 
). This crisis will not be averted until one all-important
issue is resolved: that of low-wage work. Home care jobs do not pay enough to sus-
tain most working families.
Nearly one-quarter of the workforce—
 
27.5
 
 million Americans—earned less than
$
 
8.70
 
 an hour in 
 
2001
 
. As many as 
 
4
 
 million work as direct care providers in hospi-
tals and nursing homes, through home care agencies, or as independent providers of
home care (BLS 
 
2004
 
). At least 
 
2
 
 million provide home care nationwide, earning an
average hourly wage of $
 
8.00
 
. Because wages are so low, turnover in direct care occu-
pations ranges from 
 
40
 
% to 
 
100
 
% annually, meaning that the workforce shortage
will be resolved only when recruitment and retention increase.
 
The research for this chapter was supported by grants from the Better Jobs Better Care Program,
jointly funded by The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and The Atlantic Philanthropies. I am
grateful for useful feedback from Eileen Boris, Linda Delp, Ruth Milkman, Laura Reif, and an
anonymous reviewer.
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In California home care is provided to low-income elderly and disabled persons
through the In-Home Supportive Services Program (IHSS). Until 
 
1995
 
 no IHSS
worker was paid more than the state minimum wage and none received health
insurance. Sixty-one percent of IHSS workers still earn less than $
 
8
 
 an hour, and
although many are now o
 
V
 
ered employer-based health insurance, most cannot work
enough hours to be eligible. Eight percent are still being paid the current state mini-
mum wage of $
 
6
 
.
 
75
 
 an hour. IHSS wages were the only source of earnings for 
 
77
 
%
of IHSS providers in 
 
2000
 
; they took home a median monthly wage of $
 
436
 
.
 
00
 
. In
 
2003
 
 this wage was only 
 
34
 
.
 
3
 
% of the 
 
2003
 
 federal poverty level for a family of three
(California Budget Project 
 
2004
 
).
 
1
 
The home care industry in California is gradually being transformed by unioniza-
tion and related changes obtained as a result of pressure from a coalition of unions
and home care consumers who recognized their mutual interest in a well paid, stable
workforce. What has for decades been a uniformly bad minimum-wage job, done
largely by women out of love for their clients or the need for temporary part-time
work, has become a pretty good part-time job in some California counties. Roughly
one-fourth of the IHSS workforce now earns at least $
 
9
 
.
 
50
 
 an hour and has access to
health, dental, and vision care insurance with low eligibility requirements.
This paper documents the impact that raising wages and bene
 
W
 
ts has had on turn-
over in California’s home care industry. It begins by relating the impact of unioniza-
tion and political action on home care jobs, then summarizes 
 
W
 
ndings from focus-
group sessions with home care providers in four California counties. A review of
results from a longitudinal study of the e
 
V
 
ects of wage and bene
 
W
 
t increases in San
Francisco County on home care worker turnover provides background for the pre-
sentation of new evidence from a cross-sectional analysis of the e
 
V
 
ect of wage di
 
V
 
er-
entials among broad county categories and between Los Angeles and San Francisco
counties. The 
 
W
 
ndings show that higher wages are correlated with lower turnover at
the state level.
 
BACKGROUND
 
Home care is long-term care that is provided in the home to frail elderly and dis-
abled persons who would otherwise require care in an institution such as a nursing
home, a residential care facility, an intermediate care facility, or a state hospital. The
very large majority of people needing long-term care services receive them in nonin-
stitutional settings. A nationwide survey conducted between 
 
1995
 
 and 
 
1997
 
 found
that approximately 
 
13
 
.
 
2
 
 million people living at home needed some assistance with
the basic activities of daily living such as eating, bathing, and dressing, as well as
assistance with shopping and housekeeping. In 
 
1958
 
 only 
 
2
 
,
 
000
 
 people were employed
as home care workers. Although most home care is still provided by unpaid family
 
1
 
. The median wage is based on data for the fourth quarter of 
 
2000
 
.
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caregivers, home care has grown since the early 
 
1960
 
s into an occupation that
employs an estimated 
 
2
 
 million people nationwide.
 
2
 
 In California in 
 
2000
 
, approxi-
mately 
 
2
 
 million people living at home needed some assistance (Medi-Cal Policy
Institute 
 
2001
 
). And, as of December 
 
2003
 
, approximately 
 
270
 
,
 
000
 
 IHSS workers
were providing home care services to more than 
 
300
 
,
 
000
 
 Californians.
This transformation of home care into a substantial occupation resulted from a
combination of factors: the expansion of health and social services in the 
 
1950
 
s and
 
1960
 
s to cover more groups, equal opportunity legislation that favored the provision
of long-term care in community and home-based settings, federal emphasis on
funding social services programs that help recipients become self-su
 
Y
 
cient, an
increase in the proportion of the population that is living with one or more disabili-
ties (DHHS and DOL 
 
2003
 
), a decline in the size and geographic proximity of fam-
ilies, and the movement of women into the workforce since the 
 
1960
 
s. IHSS was
o
 
Y
 
cially created in 
 
1972
 
 to consolidate organization and provision of home care at
the state level. Today IHSS has two components. The Personal Care Services Pro-
gram (PCSP) provides nonmedical personal care services, such as assistance with
administration of medication, bathing, oral hygiene, grooming, and dressing; these
services are funded by the federal government as well as counties and the state. The
Residual Program provides these same nonmedical personal services, as well as assis-
tance with household chores, such as cleaning, shopping, and yard work; these are
funded by counties and the state. A number of people currently covered under the
Residual Program would qualify for the PCSP program but for the fact that they are
being cared for by a parent (in the case of a disabled minor) or spouse. IHSS partic-
ipants must meet income eligibility requirements for both programs.
Initially, all funding for the program came from state revenues, but in 
 
1975
 
 IHSS
received a signi
 
W
 
cant boost when Title XX of the Social Services Act was enacted
speci
 
W
 
cally to fund services that would help recipients achieve self-su
 
Y
 
ciency, reduce
their dependency, and prevent inappropriate institutional care—a goal that clearly
encompassed funding for home care services. Under Title XX, renamed the Social
Services Block Grant (SSBG) in 
 
1981
 
, California was able to shift a substantial por-
tion of the cost of its attendant care services (as well as other services including
adoption, adult and child day care, foster care, and protective services) to the federal
government. The federal government paid 
 
75
 
% of the costs of the SSBG programs,
 
2
 
. The Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that there were 
 
2
 
.
 
2
 
 million formal long-term care
workers, including 
 
478,000 home care workers, nationwide in 2003 (BLS 2004). BLS counts
only those home care providers who work at wage and salary employment in nursing and per-
sonal care facilities, residential care facilities and home health services, which excludes some of
the principal modes in which home care aides are employed—namely, through temporary help
agencies and public agencies or as self-employed independent providers. In 1999 there were an
estimated 100,000 home care providers in six other states that have similar public programs
(LeBlanc et al. 2001). There is virtually no information about the number of people who work
as independent contractors to those private employers; however, an estimate of 1.5 to 2.0 mil-
lion home care workers nationwide seems reasonable.
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but only up to a nationwide cap of $2.7 billion (Committee on Ways and Means
2000). States paid the full marginal cost of programs once they exceeded their share
of the allocated monies.
By the early 1980s, although some counties still contracted with agencies, the
IHSS program was established as a largely consumer-directed program, meaning
that the consumer (the recipient of home care services) can hire, supervise, and, if
need be, Wre the provider.3 The county social services authorized hours of service and
maintained timesheets for workers, and the state paid the wages from a combination
of federal and state funds. IHSS workers were public employees, but the public enti-
ties that employed them were not clearly their employers. Wages constituted the
bulk of the cost of the program, and while the federal government paid a share of
the costs, IHSS workers and IHSS services, like all public employees and services,
were still vulnerable to the state’s Wscal problems.
Because IHSS is a consumer-directed program, a far larger share of California’s
long-term care services are provided in home- and community-based settings than is
the norm nationwide, and a much larger proportion of the population receives the
service at lower overall cost.4 Because of this contrast, political support for IHSS
funding was weak. Moreover, because workers were not classiWed as employees
under the National Labor Relations Act, they could not legally join a union.
During the 1980s the United Domestic Workers (UDW), now an AFSCME
aYliate, and the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) began trying to
organize the growing home care workforce.5 UDW concentrated on IHSS workers
who were employed by proprietary and nonproWt agencies under contract to coun-
ties. SEIU concentrated on the so-called independent providers (Boris and Klein
2003). In 1987, following an extensive grassroots organizing eVort in Los Angeles in
3. The consumer-directed mode has its origins in California’s nonmedical-model attendant care
program, which was started in 1960. California’s nascent disability rights movement struggled
to deWne this program as consumer directed from its inception (Reif 2004).
4. In 2002 California ranked fourth among states in per capita spending on the Medicaid Per-
sonal Care Services Option and second behind New York in total expenditures on the PCS
Option, but it ranked forty-seventh among states in per capita spending on all Long Term
Care. Medicaid spending on California’s PCS program grew by 285% between 1997 and 2002,
but spending on total LTC increased by only 60%, which is somewhat above the national aver-
age of 46% (Burwell et al. 2003).
In 1999 California, compared to Texas, provided more hours of service to roughly the same
proportion of its population at half the cost per consumer; agency-based provision of services is
the norm in Texas. In California the Medicaid personal care service reached 4.32 out of every
1,000 in the population, providing up to 10.1 hours of service a day, based on need, and the
annual expenditure per Medicaid recipient was $2,389.00. In contrast, Texas provided a maxi-
mum of 7.1 hours a day to a very slightly higher proportion of the population—4.52 consumers
per 1,000 in population—at twice the cost, $4,716.00 per consumer annually. (Estimates are
author’s calculations based on data from LeBlanc et al. 2001.)
5. The path to unionization has been well documented in other sources (Delp and Quan 2002;
Heinritz-Canterbury 2002; Walsh 2001).
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which the union signed up 20,000 workers to Wle for an early election, SEIU Local
434B sued Los Angeles County to establish the county as the employer of record.
The court found that the consumer, county, and state each performed some
employer functions but that no single entity performed all, so none could stand as
the employer of record (Walsh 2001). With no employer of record, workers had no
right to organize a union or bargain for better wages and beneWts.
Following that defeat, the union continued its organizing drive in Los Angeles. It
lobbied for and won voluntary dues deductions for those who had signed up and
developed a series of services for members, nonmembers, and consumers, including
a registry to help consumers Wnd providers. Because there is no single workplace in
which IHSS workers can come together, the union developed a strategy of direct
action that included marches, rallies, demonstrations, and civil disobedience to help
workers cohere around a common agenda (Heinritz-Canterbury 2002; Walsh 2001).
By the late 1980s, following rapid growth of the consumer population, California
was spending well beyond its allotment of SSBG funds, and IHSS was absorbing an
increasingly large share.6 Roughly 170,000 consumers in Wfty-eight counties were
receiving IHSS services from a poorly organized program that still paid workers the
minimum wage. Pay checks were frequently late, turnover was very high, and, as a
Little Hoover Commission report documented, consumers lived in fear that provid-
ers would Wnd better jobs and leave them unattended (Little Hoover Commission
1991). The commission recognized that although many in the independent living
community preferred consumer-directed care, some of the severely disabled, frail
elderly, and cognitively impaired had diYculty Wnding, screening, and supervising
providers. At the same time that IHSS was facing this criticism from the commis-
sion, the state was embroiled in a budget crisis that further threatened the program.
In October 1991 the governor cut IHSS hours by 12% to reduce expenditures, add-
ing to the Wscal pressure engendered by the Xat budget requirements from the SSBG
(Heinritz-Canterbury 2002).
Galvanized by fear that problems in IHSS would threaten the program’s con-
sumer-directed model, the disability community joined with a senior advocacy
group and SEIU to Wght for improvements in the program. This coalition pressed
for the passage of signiWcant legislation in 1992 that authorized, although it did not
mandate, the creation of a public authority at the county level to deliver home care
services. The legislation did require that public authorities either had to be or had to
create an employer of record for workers; public authorities also had to develop a
countywide registry that would link consumers with available workers and provide
access to training. Once a county established an employer of record, unions could
organize the workers and, upon recognition, bargain directly with it. A consumer-
majority board with worker representation was to act as director and advisor to the
public authority (Heinritz-Canterbury 2002).
6. Much of the material in the rest of this section is based on an interview with Laura Reif
(2004).
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So that resources would be available to raise wages and establish public authori-
ties, the coalition also helped devise a plan that would allow the state to shift much
of the expense of the IHSS program to Medicaid. The disability community had
opposed state adoption of the PCSP option up to this point because consumers
could participate only if their personal care services plan had been written by a doc-
tor and was supervised by a nurse. The coalition successfully pressured the state to
apply to the federal government for a waiver on the grounds that the state already
had a program in place and was doing eVective assessment through social services
without the involvement of doctors and nurses. The waiver was accepted, and when
the state adopted the Medicaid PCSP option in 1993, making personal care an enti-
tlement for all eligible consumers, federal matching funds at a rate of 50 cents on the
dollar brought a large new infusion of cash into the IHSS system.
New money and expanded eligibility brought many new consumers and provid-
ers into the rapidly expanding program. Between 1994 and 1999 seven counties orga-
nized public authorities: Alameda, Contra Costa, Monterey, San Francisco, San
Mateo, Santa Clara (all in Northern California), and Los Angeles. All seven had
union elections, culminating with a successful election in Los Angeles that brought
74,000 new home care workers into SEIU. New legislation in 1999 mandated the
creation of employers of record and consumer majority advisory committees in all
counties by 2003.
Bargaining for higher wages, however, triggered a new set of political and legisla-
tive challenges. About the time that the Medicaid PCSP option was adopted, the
state also pushed through a new budget agreement, referred to as “realignment,” in
which part of the cost of some programs, including IHSS, would be reassigned to
the counties. The state provided revenue to cover the new county costs, but it was
only as good as the tax base from which it was drawn. What realignment meant for
IHSS funding, speciWcally, was that after the federal government had paid 50% of
the PCSP costs, the state would pay 65% of the remaining costs and counties would
pay 35% from funding that might not be suYcient to cover the costs. Moreover, the
state agreed to pay 65% of remaining costs only up to a maximum wage rate of
$6.75, which meant that if a county agreed to pay wages higher than $6.75, it had
to pick up the entire additional nonfederal share. Not surprisingly, many counties
were reluctant to take the risk of increasing their wage obligations to a program that
was growing rapidly and for which the funding was shaky.
SigniWcantly, the 1999 legislation also required the state to contribute the diVer-
ence between the minimum wage and a target wage that would rise over a four-year
period—beginning in Wscal year 2002—to $11.50 an hour plus $0.60 per hour for
beneWts (Heinritz-Canterbury 2002).7 As of June 2004 all counties had set up public
7. The state is only required to pay its share of increased wages if the revenue in the general fund
has increased by 5% in the previous Wscal year. California entered a recession in 2000, so that
condition has not been met for most of the years since the law was passed.
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authorities (or, in three cases, nonproWt consortia), and thirty-nine had conducted
successful union elections (Keeslar 2004).
Nearly Wfty years after the Wrst attendant care program was established in Califor-
nia, and after decades of union organizing and political action on the part of a labor-
consumer coalition, home care has been transformed into an above-minimum-wage
job with beneWts in some counties. In those counties where workers are still paid the
minimum wage and union elections have yet to be held, at least the institutional
conditions for unionization are in place. Budget politics are the next frontier.
THE NATURE OF THE JOB
During the spring of 2004 we conducted a series of focus-group conversations with
home care providers in four California counties.8 The participants represented the
range of home care providers, from family providers, to career providers, to retirees
who were working not because they needed the money so much as because they
enjoyed the work. Our conversations with these men and women revealed a great
deal about the nature of the job.
Among the family providers were three who were caring for their disabled chil-
dren. The Wrst was a seventy-six-year-old woman who had been caring for her forty-
two-year-old Down syndrome son since birth. Twelve years ago she learned that she
could be paid by IHSS for providing this care, and she was able to resign from her
other job, that of running a regional center for developmentally disabled children.
Because her son could accompany her to work, the position had allowed her to
avoid institutionalizing him. The second of the three was a man who was caring for
his Wfteen-year-old autistic son; he had left his job in transportation when his former
wife was on the verge of putting their son in an institution.
The third, a woman who was caring for her Down syndrome son, said that to
avoid a medevac every time her son had a medical emergency, she and her husband
had moved closer to hospital services. Her husband had given up his ministry when
they relocated. He was able to Wnd other employment, but it was only because she
was being paid by IHSS that they were able to aVord decent housing for themselves
and their four children. When asked what she would do if the wages in her county
were cut from the present level of $9.50 to the state minimum wage, as had been
proposed by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, she began to weep. She and the man
caring for his autistic son told us that they would probably have to institutionalize
their children if the wage dropped that low. Both knew what it would be like to try
8. These focus groups were conducted as part of the process of preparing a comprehensive pro-
vider survey to be administered in these counties during the summer. The focus groups that I
participated in were conducted in two rural counties by Lea Grundy of the UC Berkeley Labor
Center. Linda Delp of the UCLA Labor Center conducted focus groups in other counties in
Southern California.
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to live on $6.75 an hour: they would not be able to provide for their families’ basic
needs. Both were unwilling to impose that hardship on family members, and both
said they would have to Wnd other full-time jobs. These three family providers
received approximately ten hours of pay a day from IHSS for a round-the-clock job.
Were these caregivers not subsidizing the state with their free labor, the state would
be spending twice as much to keep their children in institutions.
It is tempting to think of people who provide care to family members as tempo-
rary workers who will move on to other jobs when the family member no longer
needs their care, and it is easy to forget that they are often career care providers.
Moreover, evidence from these focus groups suggests that many people who enter
the workforce as family providers decide to stay and become nonfamily providers, a
choice that is surely inXuenced by the wage they expect to earn. Many nonfamily
providers also ultimately care for their family members. This is supported by a previ-
ous survey done in Alameda County (Howes 2003), which found that 10% of provid-
ers who were currently working as nonfamily providers had entered the workforce as
family providers and that only 30% of those who were currently working as family
providers had actually entered IHSS as a family provider.
Home care oVers important employment opportunities within the community.
These jobs are available to high school educated workers, and since they are part-
time and somewhat Xexible, they can be combined with family responsibilities,
including caring for children or other dependents, and other part-time, or even full-
time, employment.9 Forty percent of the providers we surveyed in Alameda County
had another job: some worked in food services, retail shops, or oYces; others sewed
or drove trucks; still others provided private-care home care or child care. For most,
though, IHSS was their primary employer.
Several of the focus group participants were long-time caregivers who “special-
ized” in aged alcoholics. One woman was working full time for several consumers,
and IHSS was her only job; another woman, retired from a previous career, was pro-
viding care because she wanted to continue working and enjoyed taking care of
people. Yet another woman had made a career of home care. Her career started when
she lost the welfare subsidy that had allowed her to stay home and care for her disabled
son. She needed multiple clients to make home care a full-time job, yet she could
not aVord to own a vehicle or pay for gas. She was able to make a career of home care
only because a friend drove her to her clients’ houses.
Home care is not a full-time job for most providers. Consumers need the same
kind of assistance at about the same time of day, and most consumers are not autho-
rized enough hours to employ a caregiver full time. Depending on the level of
impairment, an IHSS worker’s tasks may range from helping an elderly person with
9. Appelbaum et al. (2004) report that the majority of low-wage workers in the United States
have no credentials beyond a high school diploma and that many, particularly immigrants, fall
short even of that. For this reason they refer to the low-wage workers who are the focus of their
study (and of this study) as “high school educated workers.”
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limited mobility complete his or her weekly shopping, cleaning, and cooking, to
providing extensive personal care. Many consumers need assistance getting up in the
morning and with bathing, dressing, feeding, and toileting. One-third the consumer
population is made up of disabled adults of working age; many do work, but they
are able to do so only because their attendant assists them with the activities of daily
living, giving them the time and freedom to do other activities. Because IHSS
workers provide these homemaking and personal care services for their clients, few
can create a daily or weekly schedule that combines two or more clients without put-
ting the client at risk or causing the provider tremendous stress. Home care is a
physically demanding and emotionally draining job, and about three-fourths of the
IHSS workforce earns poor wages and has no beneWts. Findings from the focus
groups indicated that many providers would not stay with the job were it not for
their personal commitment to their clients.
Fortunately, in some counties IHSS is no longer a minimum-wage job with no
beneWts. It is still inherently part-time, but some counties now pay wages as high as
$10.50 an hour and oVer individual beneWts that include health, dental, and vision
care. Whether higher wages and beneWts are producing a more stable workforce, as
was envisioned by the consumer-labor coalition that fought so hard to get public
authorities and unionization, is the empirical question that I address next.
WAGES AND RETENTION IN SAN FRANCISCO COUNTY
Between November 1997 and February 2002 the IHSS wage rate in San Francisco
County increased from about $5.00 an hour, which was then pennies above the
minimum wage rate for the state, to $10.00 an hour. Individual health insurance was
oVered at a low monthly premium to any provider who had worked at least twenty-
Wve hours per month in two consecutive months, and dental insurance and vision
care were added for providers who had worked six months. To assess the eVect of
these wage and beneWt increases on the recruitment and retention of new home care
workers in San Francisco County, I conducted a time series analysis using a longitu-
dinal database that covered the Wfty-two-month period (Howes 2002, 2003, forth-
coming). The data were drawn from the California Management, Information and
Payrolling Database (CMIPS), which is maintained by the California Department
of Social Services, Adult Services Division.10
This study looked speciWcally at the retention of new providers. Since wages and
beneWts improved greatly over the period of study, I was concerned that there would
10. These conWdential data, which are updated monthly, provide the information necessary to con-
struct a detailed demographic proWle of the workforce and, when suYcient months are available,
to estimate turnover. The author was given access to Wfty-two months of conWdential CMIPS
data, from November 1997 to February 2002. I received permission to use the data as part of a
research project funded by Atlantic Philanthropies and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation.
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be considerable short-term movement in and out of the workforce as people tried
out the now better-compensated job, then went back to previous jobs when they
either discovered they did not like home care or perhaps had received deferred med-
ical treatment and dental care. To measure turnover that results from extreme dissat-
isfaction with the job, including unhappiness with wages and beneWts, as well as the
negative impact turnover has on the consumer, I measured the percentage of the
workforce that left IHSS even though the consumer remained with the service.11
This measure netted out “natural” turnover—that is, turnover that occurs when a
provider leaves along with a consumer. Natural turnover is less likely to be aVected
by trends in the wage rate. More than half of IHSS providers work for a family
member, a close friend, or someone to whom they have become close while provid-
ing care services. On the one hand, workers who have a personal commitment to a
consumer are rarely willing to quit if, as is often the case, it puts the consumer at
risk; on the other hand, as many providers in focus groups and survey pretests told
us, providers often do quit as soon as the consumer no longer needs them.
Only 39% of new providers who entered the IHSS workforce between November
1997 and February 1998 remained for at least a year (Table 3.1).12 This is equivalent
to a 61% turnover rate for new providers. There were signiWcant diVerences in reten-
tion rates across ethnicities and between family providers—those caring for a spouse,
parent, child or other family member—and nonfamily providers—those caring for
consumers who were not family members. The retention rate for new family provid-
ers was 44%; for new nonfamily providers it was 34%. Russian family providers were
far more likely than any other group to stay in the job for a year, and African Amer-
ican nonfamily providers had by far the lowest retention rates. By the time the wage
reached $10 an hour, in 2001, the annual retention rate for new workers had risen by
94% to 74%. Both family and nonfamily worker retention nearly doubled. There
were substantial increases in retention among all ethnic groups, and the variability in
retention among ethnic groups had narrowed considerably, especially for family pro-
viders. Most striking is that retention rates among African American nonfamily
providers rose 287%, rising from rates that were roughly half the mean for the non-
family workforce. By 2001 retention rates for this group of providers had converged
almost to the workforce mean for nonfamily providers—67%.
Wage and beneWt improvements appear to have increased provider retention in
San Francisco County, yet the magnitude of the wage eVect was markedly diVerent
among ethnic groups. If our goal is to understand the factors that increase recruit-
ment and retention so that we can design good public policy, we must evaluate how
11. Note that the estimated coeYcients reported in this paper are only for the aggregate regres-
sions. Readers should refer to the original article, where this measure of turnover was Wrst
used, for details of the regression results on ethnicity (see Howes forthcoming).
12. In the San Francisco study I counted a provider who exited the workforce for up to two
months and then reentered as two distinct providers.
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these factors are related to ethnicity. Ethnicity may aVect turnover through at least
two channels. First, some ethnic groups are more likely to care for family members
because of cultural norms. In San Francisco, African Americans and Latinos are tra-
ditionally more likely to hire family providers than are Whites, Russians, and Chi-
nese. If turnover is lower among family providers, having a higher proportion of
family providers will pull down the average turnover rate in an ethnic group.
Whether trends in the wage rate will have diVerential eVects by family and ethnicity
is another matter. In addition, new family providers have consistently lower turn-
over rates than do new nonfamily providers, possibly because family providers are
more committed to their consumers and are less likely to abandon them if a better
opportunity presents itself, at least as long as the consumer needs them.13 Retention
of family providers might be less aVected by trends in the wage rate for the same
reason: some people in the focus groups said that they would care for their family
member regardless of the wage. If being a family provider mutes the eVect of wage
trends, then being a member of an ethnic group that disproportionately is made up
of family providers will also depress the eVect of wage increases on that group’s
retention.
Another mechanism that causes diVering wage eVects is related to ethnic varia-
tions in the employment opportunities that are available to potential caregivers.
table 3 . 1 . Percentage of New IHSS Providers Who Remained in the Workforce for at Least 
One Year, by Ethnicity, San Francisco County, November 1997–February 2002
all  new providers new family  providers
new nonfamily  
providers
1997–98 2000–01 Change 1997–98 2000–01 Change 1997–98 2000–01 Change
Latino 41% 68% 65% 52% 78% 50% 28% 57% 104%
Chinese 34% 75% 122% 39% 79% 103% 28% 67% 140%
Russian 58% 77% 32% 62% 80% 29% 56% 74% 34%
African
American 27% 72% 166% 36% 80% 121% 16% 63% 287%
White 29% 65% 120% 27% 73% 170% 31% 55% 78%
Total 39% 74% 89% 44% 80% 81% 34% 67% 94%
source : CDSS n.d.
note : Excludes natural turnover—that is, turnover that occurs when a provider leaves IHSS because a consumer dis-
continues IHSS services. Retention rates are averages for new entrants in November 1997–February 1998 and 
November 2000–February 2001.
13. Solari (2004) provides a good example of how provider attitudes to family caregiving vary by
ethnicity. In the case she describes, Russian Christian home care providers see themselves as
“saints” and, like a family caregiver, as caregivers who have a personal commitment to the cli-
ent, whereas the Russian Jewish providers model themselves more as professionals.
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Most home care recipients try to hire someone who lives close or who belongs to
their community, which more often than not means someone of their own ethnic-
ity. In ethnically diverse areas, or areas in which concentrations of minority ethnic
groups are embedded in a majority community, the labor market will usually be
segmented by ethnicity. Latinos are frequently employed in food services; Chinese
often work in garment factories in the Bay Area.14 Home care is an ethnic niche
job in some rural areas of California, including the perimeter of the Sacramento
Valley, where there are concentrations of Hmong home care workers. Waldinger
and Lichter (2003) have shown that job opportunities are hierarchized by ethnic-
ity, with African Americans occupying higher strata than Latinos or newer South-
east Asian immigrants of similar educational attainment. Chinese, Latino, White,
and African American home care workers in Alameda County reported distinct
associations between ethnicity and type of job for jobs other than their IHSS jobs
(Howes 2003). African Americans, for example, were able to get much better
alternative jobs than either Chinese or Latino home care workers. Members of
groups with a better range of alternatives will need higher wages to convince
them to stay in home care, explaining why the impact of wage increases might
vary by ethnicity.
Home care becomes relatively less attractive when labor markets are tight and
more attractive during periods of high unemployment, so any attempt to parse out
the eVect of wages and beneWts must control for local labor market conditions. A
multivariate logistic regression model was used to estimate the impact of wage and
beneWt increases on the probability of a new provider staying in the home care job
for at least a year. The model included an independent variable to measure trends in
the wage rate, a dummy variable to indicate whether the worker was a family pro-
vider, and an interactive variable (termed “wage3family”) between the wage rate and
the family dummy variable to calculate the eVect on responsiveness to wage changes
of being a family provider. A second dummy variable was used to indicate whether
health insurance was available in each month, and a third was used to indicate the
availability of dental insurance as well. Finally, to control for local labor market
factors that would aVect retention, a trend variable was included, measuring employ-
ment in the labor market in San Francisco County. Equations were estimated
regressing the probability of a new provider lasting a year in the job on the indepen-
dent variables for the entire population.15 (See Appendix A for a summary of the
research design.)
I found that the probability of a new provider lasting a year in the job in-
creases as wages rise and as health and dental insurance are added, as Table 3.2
14. See Waldinger 1996 and Waldinger and Lichter 2003 for a discussion of ethnic niche jobs in
the United States.
15. See Howes forthcoming for greater detail on the methodology and for estimates by ethnicity.
I estimated separate equations for each ethnic group because I assumed the underlying causal
mechanism would vary by ethnicity owing to diVerences in culture and economic opportunity.
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shows.16 The coeYcients on these three variables were all positive, as predicted,
and all were highly statistically signiWcant.17 Surprisingly, the results suggest that
the probability of a new provider lasting a year is lower for family providers, but
the results were mixed because the coeYcient in the aggregate equation was statis-
tically signiWcant but was not signiWcant for most of the ethnic groups. The
wage*family interactive variable does not support the hypothesis that new family
providers are less likely to base their decision to stay in the workforce on wage
level; rather, it suggests that they are more likely to be inXuenced by higher
wages. Finally, the results show not only that tightness in the labor market does
reduce home care retention but also that had it not been for the IHSS wage in-
creases, a net exodus from the San Francisco home care labor market would have
occurred between 1997 and 2001.
Table 3.3 shows the probable impact on retention when new workers receive
higher wages or insurance or are family providers. Probabilities were determined by
increasing each independent variable by one unit while holding all other variables
constant at their mean values. Increasing the wage by $1.00 from its mean of $8.85
increases the probability of a new worker lasting a year by 12.3 percentage points.
The probability for a new family provider (determined by adding the probabilities
table 3 .2 . Probability of a New IHSS Provider Remaining in the Workforce 
for a Year or More, San Francisco County, November 1997–February 2002
Estimated 
CoeYcient a
Standard 
Error
Z 
Statistic BIC a
Wage rate 0.737**** 0.039 18.9 361.8
Family provider 21.403**** 0.035 240.1 31.4
Wage3family 0.205**** 0.035 5.9 18.4
Health insurance 1.035**** 0.090 11.5 129.0
Dental insurance 1.155**** 0.116 10.0 95.6
San Francisco employment 20.097**** 0.003 232.3 902.4
Constant 32.539**** 1.252 26.0 672.4
Probability of retention at mean 
of all independent variables 0.790
N 10,574
pseudo R2 0.374
source : CDSS n.d.
a * 0–2: weak; ** 2–6: positive; *** 6–10: strong; **** 101: very strong.
16. Marginal probabilities are calculated from the coeYcients and are presented later in the text.
17. This was true also for the separate equations estimated for each ethnic group; see Howes
forthcoming.
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for wage rate and wage3family) increases by 15.7 percentage points.18 Increasing an
hourly wage of $8.00—the average wage paid to home care workers in the United
States—to $9.00 increases the probability of a new worker remaining for a year by
17 percentage points.
Table 3.4 shows the impact of various wage levels on retention.19 If the wage drops
to $6.75, the estimates suggest that retention will fall to 44%. SigniWcant variability
by ethnicity is evident, and particularly remarkable is the retention rate for African
Americans, which is estimated to be 11% at this low wage. One of the signiWcant Wnd-
ings of this study is that the wage has to increase to far higher levels for African Amer-
ican and White workers before their retention rates rise to the levels that other ethnic
groups achieve at around $8.50 an hour. As Table 3.4 shows, the retention rate for
new African American workers does not rise above 70% until the wage reaches
$10.00 an hour. These results support the hypothesis that retention will vary across
ethnic groups at the same wage level because of diVerences in alternative opportunities.
Although Table 3.3 shows the marginal eVect of increasing health and dental
insurance at the mean, the more meaningful comparison is the eVect on turnover
table 3 .3 . Marginal Probability of a New IHSS Provider 
Remaining in the Workforce for a Year or More, 
San Francisco County, November 1997–February 2002
Mean
Marginal 
Probability
Wage rate $8.85 0.123
Family provider 0.495 20.235
Wage3family 4.487 0.034
Health insurance 0.818 0.173
Dental insurance 0.713 0.193
San Francisco employment 406.900 20.016
source : CDSS n.d.
note: Measures the marginal probability of a worker remaining a year or 
more associated with an additional unit of the independent variable, 
measured at the mean of the independent variables.
18. Since the logit function is nonlinear, the marginal probability measures the rate of change at a
single point on the function associated with a small change in an independent variable. A
$1.00 increase in the wage rate is a large change, so the actual change in the probability of
remaining a year is only an approximation and is in fact somewhat smaller than 12.3 percent-
age points.
19. In each case I assume that the other independent variables are held at the mean of the popula-
tion, meaning that 81% had access to health insurance, 71% had access to dental insurance,
and 50% were family providers.
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when health insurance is not available. Table 3.5 shows that adding health insurance
increases the retention rate for a new worker by 21 percentage points; adding dental
insurance has a similar eVect. In the real world, Governor Schwarzenegger’s pro-
posal to cut the wage to $6.75 also includes eliminating health insurance. Under
that scenario the model predicts that retention will drop to 25%.
Although the San Francisco study found that retention was higher for home care
providers who were caring for family members, as is the case statewide, it also
showed that wage and beneWt increases had roughly the same marginal eVect on the
retention of both family and nonfamily providers. Family providers may do this job
for love, the results suggest, but it is still the case that they need to provide for their
entire family. When caring for one family member jeopardizes the providers’ ability
table 3 .4 . Probability of a New IHSS Provider Remaining in the Workforce 
for a Year or More after Entry, Associated with Wage Level, San Francisco County, 
November 1997–February 2002
All 
Providers Latino Chinese Russian 
African
American White
$6.75 44% 57% 52% 70% 11% 19%
$8.00 66% 65% 66% 77% 47% 57%
$8.85 79% 75% 79% 85% 68% 72%
$10.00 90% 84% 90% 92% 87% 87%
source : CDSS n.d.
note : Measures the probability of a new worker remaining a year or more, holding other 
independent variables at their mean.
table 3 .5 . Probability of a New IHSS Provider 
Remaining in the Workforce for a Year or More after Entry, 
Associated with Insurance, San Francisco County, 
November 1997–February 2002
Without With
Health insurance 61% 82%
Dental insurance 62% 84%
source :  CDSS n.d.
note :  Measures the probability of a new worker remaining a year or 
more when there is no health insurance or no dental insurance and 
when all have access to insurance, holding other independent variables 
at their mean.
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to care for all family members because wages are too low, they are forced to make the
same choices that other workers make.
WAGES AND TURNOVER IN CALIFORNIA
Since IHSS wages and beneWts (above the minimum of $6.75 per hour) are set or
negotiated at the county level, county administrators and union locals need to know
what factors increase retention at county and community levels when they are nego-
tiating contracts, be it wages or beneWts. The San Francisco County study provided
solid statistical evidence that higher wages and beneWts reduce turnover among
home care workers, holding other factors constant. Each group analyzed displayed
diVerent underlying rates of turnover and unique response patterns to changes in the
wage and beneWt structure. The next step was to expand the study to the entire state
through a cross-sectional analysis. Two new variables not considered in the San
Francisco study were included in the statewide study: the number of consumers per
provider, and the number of hours of work authorized to each provider. Although it
is diYcult to provide IHSS services to more than one client, especially where travel
between clients is required, a larger number of clients may reduce turnover since the
provider is more likely to achieve an adequate income from the job. The same argu-
ment holds for the number of hours authorized per month for the provider. The
descriptive data and logit analysis for this statewide study used CMIPS data for the
period December 2002 through December 2003.20
As in San Francisco, the IHSS workforce in California is highly diverse. Table 3.6
shows the ethnic distribution of the state’s workforce and the proportion of care-
givers who are family providers; also included are the average age and the proportion
who are female within each ethnic group. Twenty-three percent of providers were
Latino, 16% were African American, and 35% were White. The Wve other largest dis-
tinct ethnic categories, each representing at least 3% of the provider population,
were Chinese, Russian, Armenian, Filipino, and Vietnamese.
An estimated 70% of all IHSS workers were family providers in 2003.21 As in San
Francisco, there was tremendous variation among ethnic groups; Filipinos, Viet-
namese, and other Asians were far more likely to be family providers, and Russians,
followed by African Americans and Whites, were the least likely. The data presented
20. Most of the descriptive statistics are for December 2003, whereas the regression analysis uses
data for the thirteen-month period.
21. This estimate of the percentage of family providers diVers from calculations made by the state
(CDSS 2001). Providers do not have to say whether they are family providers during their
interview with a social worker, so the data are incomplete in CMIPS. I have done my own
measure, identifying as a family provider anyone who reports that he or she is a family mem-
ber of a consumer, lives in the same house as a consumer, has the same last name as a con-
sumer, or is given a certain tax code that indicates that he or she is a relative of the consumer.
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in Table 3.6 are unadjusted turnover for all providers;22 nonetheless, when compared
to the Wndings from the San Francisco study, the statewide data show similar relative
turnover by ethnicity. Armenians and Russians had the lowest rates of turnover,
while Whites and African Americans had the highest. Since the patterns of ethnic
variation in turnover rates persist statewide, one possible explanation for the diVer-
ences in turnover rates that we will see by county may be due to diVerences in ethnic
composition and the proportion of family providers. Counties with high propor-
tions of Whites and nonfamily providers, for example, would be expected to have
higher turnover rates.
In the analysis that follows, counties and their IHSS workers are grouped into
categories with similar labor market and IHSS employment conditions. The demo-
graphic characteristics of the workforce tend to be similar within categories and to
vary across categories. Table 3.7 shows the county categories that were used. I
assigned each of the Wfty-eight counties to one of six geographical categories: North-
ern Urban, Southern Urban, Northern Suburban and Coast, Southern Suburban
and Coast, Rural Mountain and Coast, and Rural Agricultural. IHSS wages are dis-
tributed into three categories: low (less than $7.50), medium ($7.50 to 8.50), and
high (greater than $8.50).
All counties that fall into any one category have several features in common. The
Wrst broad diVerentiator is whether a county is rural. Counties are deWned as rural if
less than half of the population is concentrated in one or two major towns. All
table 3 .6 . Characteristics of IHSS Providers, California, December 2003
Number of
Workers
Percentage
of Workforce
Percent
Family Providers
Percent
Female
Average
Age
Percent
Turnover
Latino 61,001 23% 73% 87% 46 26%
Chinese 13,830 5% 71% 78% 49 23%
Russian 8,236 3% 56% 66% 42 17%
Armenian 11,831 4% 75% 71% 41 15%
African American 42,228 16% 64% 75% 44 33%
White 94,044 35% 64% 76% 47 28%
Filipino 8,134 3% 88% 77% 51 27%
Vietnamese 7,852 3% 90% 72% 44 21%
Other Asian 15,397 6% 85% 72% 42 23%
Other 5,810 2% 75% 78% 48 24%
Total 268,363 100% 70% 78% 46 27%
source :  CDSS n.d.
22. Recall that I looked at retention rather than turnover rates in the San Francisco study, but that
turnover is simply 1 minus the retention rate. Recall also that in the San Francisco study I was
measuring adjusted turnover of new providers only, netting out the eVect of natural exits.
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table 3 .7 . IHSS Wages and BeneWts, by County Category, California, December 2003
Urban Counties
Suburban and
Coast Counties
Rural Mountain and
Coast Counties
Rural 
Agricultural Counties
Northern Northern
Alameda $9.50b Contra Costa $9.50? Alpine $7.11 Fresno $7.50a
Sacramento $9.50a Marin $9.75a Amador $6.95 Imperial $6.75
San Francisco $10.28b Monterey $9.50? Butte $7.11 Kern $6.75
Santa Clara $10.50b Napa $9.50b Calaveras $6.75 Kings $6.75
San Mateo $9.50b Colusa $6.75 Madera $6.75
Santa Cruz $9.50b Del Norte $6.75 Merced $6.95
Solano $9.50? El Dorado $6.75 San Joaquin ?
Sonoma $9.50a Glenn $7.11 San Benito ?
Yolo $9.60a Humboldt $6.75 Tulare $6.75
Lake $6.75
Lassen $6.75
Southern Southern Mariposa $6.75
Los Angeles $7.50a Orange $8.00a Mendocino $7.11
San Diego $8.50a Riverside $8.00a Modoc $6.75
San Bernardino $8.50 Mono $7.11
Ventura $7.11 Nevada $7.11
Placer $6.75a
Plumas $7.11
San Luis Obispo $6.95
Santa Barbara $7.11a
Shasta $6.75
Sierra $7.11
Siskiyou $6.75
Stanislaus $6.95
Sutter $6.75
Tehema $6.75
Trinity $6.75
Tuolomne $6.75
Yuba $6.75
source : CDSS n.d.; Keeslar 2004.
a Health insurance available requiring 60–80 hours of work per month to qualify.
b Health insurance requiring less than 35 hours of work per month to qualify.
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twenty-nine counties in the Rural Mountain and Coast category largely Wt this
description; all are located in the mountain regions or on the northern coast of the
state. In addition, the population in each of these counties is more than 80% White,
and IHSS wages are low—below $7.11. Seventeen of these counties still pay the state
minimum of $6.75. Note that with the exception of counties with a large tourist
trade, all had unemployment rates that were well above the state average of 6.7% for
2003 (EDD 2004).
Rural Agriculture is the second rural category, although populations are not as
diVuse in these counties as they are in the Rural Mountain and Coast counties.
These counties are part of the San Joaquin Valley, and a high percentage of the popu-
lation in each county is Latino. IHSS wages are low—below $7.11—in these counties,
with the exception of Fresno, which reaches $7.50. These counties had unemployment
rates that exceeded twice the state average in 2003.
The remaining county categories encompass urban counties and suburban and
coastal counties. These counties have dispersed populations but are close to major
urban areas, and all prosper from living in the shadow of the urban centers they
bound. Unemployment rates are below the state average, except in Monterey and
Santa Cruz, which encompass large rural agricultural areas as well.
The urban counties are San Francisco, Alameda, Santa Clara, and Sacramento in
the north and Los Angeles and San Diego in the south. Unemployment rates in the
urban areas are all at about the state average, except for San Diego, which is far
below, and Sacramento, which is somewhat below the state average. As Table 3.7
shows, the IHSS wage rates in the Northern Urban and Northern Suburban and
Coast counties are all high—above $8.50—while those in the parallel southern
regions are all $8.50 and below.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.8 shows the ethnic distribution of providers in December 2003 by cate-
gory. The Northern Urban counties were extremely diverse, with no ethnic group
exceeding 28% and all the major ethnic groups signiWcantly represented. Forty-six
percent of all providers statewide were in the Southern Urban counties of Los Ange-
les and San Diego, with 40% in Los Angeles alone. The Southern Urban counties
were also diverse, although Latinos and Armenians made up a much greater share of
the provider population here (there are virtually no Armenians in the north), and
there were far fewer Asians and Russians. Eighty-four percent of the population
of the Rural Mountain and Coast counties was White, with a few concentrations of
Latinos found mainly on the periphery of agricultural areas. Agricultural rural areas
had disproportionately more Latinos relative to their share in the state population. A
large population of Laotians and Cambodians has settled in towns in the Central
and Sacramento Valley counties; this group is captured in the “Other Asian” cate-
gory. The Northern Suburban counties had more Latinos and Whites than did the
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Northern Urban counties. The Southern Suburban and Coast counties had more
Latinos and Whites and, notably, Vietnamese and peoples classiWed as Other Asian
(principally Cambodians, Laotians, and South Asians) than did the urban areas.
Table 3.8 also shows that providers in the Southern Suburban and Coast and
Rural Agricultural areas are most likely to be family providers, while those in the
Rural Mountain and Coast area are least likely to be family providers. On average,
70% of providers in urban areas were family providers; however, it should be noted
that most urban and suburban counties in the north, with the exception of Santa
Clara, San Mateo, Monterey, and Sacramento, have a low proportion of family pro-
viders, whereas family providers exceed 73% of the population in all southern urban
and suburban areas when Los Angeles is excluded.
Turnover varied by the family status of the provider and ethnicity, just as it did in
the San Francisco County study; in addition, turnover varied by region at the state
level. As Figure 3.1 shows, turnover—measured as the percentage of all IHSS pro-
viders in the workforce in December 2002 who had left the workforce by Decem-
ber 2003—was 35% for nonfamily providers and 23% for family providers.23 The
aggregate rate was 27%. Turnover was highest, both for nonfamily and family pro-
table 3 .8 . Ethnic Distribution, by County Category, California, December 2003
Northern 
Urban 
Counties
Southern
Urban 
Counties
Northern 
Suburban and
Coast Counties
Southern 
Suburban and
Coast Counties
Rural Mountain
and Coast 
Counties 
Rural
Agricultural 
Counties 
Latino 9% 26% 18% 31% 7% 36%
Chinese 15% 5% 2% 1% 0% 0%
Russian 11% 2% 2% 0% 0% 0%
Armenian 0% 9% 0% 0% 0% 1%
African American 18% 19% 13% 14% 2% 11%
White 28% 24% 52% 37% 84% 39%
Filipino 3% 4% 5% 2% 1% 2%
Vietnamese 6% 2% 1% 7% 0% 0%
Other Asian 6% 6% 4% 5% 3% 8%
Other 3% 2% 3% 2% 4% 2%
Number of workers 42,750 123,947 19,452 31,308 23,698 27,208
Percentage of workforce 16% 46% 7% 10% 9% 10%
Percent family providers 70% 70% 64% 79% 58% 72%
source :  CDSS n.d.
23. Note that this measure of turnover (or its inverse, retention) includes both new and continu-
ing providers.
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viders, in the Rural Mountain and Coast counties and lowest in the Southern
Urban counties.
Similar to the situation in San Francisco County before wage increases were
instated, turnover was also well above the average among African American nonfam-
ily providers and even more so among African American family providers. Turnover
was lowest among Armenians and Russians. That pattern of ethnic variation per-
sisted throughout all counties, suggesting that turnover rates are at least partially cul-
turally determined or reXect the diVering economic opportunities available to providers
depending on their ethnicity.
Figure 3.2 shows the turnover rate for providers after netting out natural turnover.
This measure shows turnover for all new and continuing providers who did not
leave when their client discontinued care. As expected, this turnover rate was consid-
erably lower than the turnover rate of all providers. As with the previous measure,
nonfamily provider turnover was higher than was family provider turnover. The
Rural Mountain and Coast counties, which are all low-wage counties, had by far the
highest turnover, running 8 percentage points, or 40%, higher than the state aver-
age. Note that once the natural turnover is netted out, family provider turnover rates
converge across county groups (Figure 3.2), with the exception of rural counties, and
ethnic groups (compare Figures 3.3 and 3.4), with the single exception of African
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Americans, who still had signiWcantly higher turnover than did other groups. The
convergence of turnover rates for family providers oVers some support for the
hypothesis that once someone decides to be a family provider—the propensity does
vary by region and ethnicity—the provider is equally likely to stay with the con-
sumer regardless of the wage rate or the local labor market conditions in which they
work.
Figure 3.5 shows adjusted turnover rates by wage category, conWrming that turn-
over is higher in low-wage counties. The medium-wage category is dominated by
Los Angeles County, where other factors keep turnover lower than it is in the high-
wage counties.
Los Angeles and San Francisco Counties
Los Angeles and San Francisco counties oVer a cross-sectional perspective on the
eVect of wage diVerentials among urban counties. Los Angeles and San Francisco
have both adopted public authorities and have bargained over wages and beneWts
with the union, but the outcomes have been markedly diVerent. San Francisco now
pays its IHSS workers $10.28 an hour and oVers them health beneWts as long as they
work at least two months consecutively and twenty-Wve hours in a month; dental
beneWts are oVered after six months. The Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors,
which acts as the public authority in Los Angeles, has resisted substantial wage
increases. IHSS workers in Los Angeles are now paid $7.50 an hour, and health
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insurance is available only if they work a total of eighty hours a month. Whereas
97% of San Francisco providers are now eligible and 53% are enrolled in the San
Francisco health insurance program provided through IHSS, the enrollment rate in
Los Angeles is only 8%, at least in part because only 30% of active providers qualify
for the program (SF IHSS Public Authority 2003; Zawadski and Radosevich 2003).
Table 3.9 shows the distribution of IHSS providers by ethnicity and the percent-
age of caregivers who are family providers in Los Angeles and San Francisco coun-
ties. Although both are very ethnically diverse, the mix is quite diVerent. Latinos
made up 26% of the Los Angeles workforce in 2003 but only 9% of the San Fran-
cisco workforce. Chinese and Russian providers represented only 6% and 3% of the
workforce in Los Angeles, respectively, but 35% and 23% in San Francisco. Arme-
nians represented 11% of the workforce in Los Angeles, but there were almost no
Armenians in San Francisco. African Americans made up 20% of the Los Angeles
workforce, but only 12% of the San Francisco workforce. Whites represented 35% of
the workforce statewide, but only 22% in Los Angeles and 11% in San Francisco.
Family providers in Los Angeles made up a considerably larger share of the pro-
vider population than they did in San Francisco. This pattern holds across all ethnic
groups with the exception of African Americans, suggesting that there is some
underlying causal mechanism that transcends ethnic practices. One possible expla-
nation is that hiring trustworthy nonfamily providers in the immediate community
is easier in San Francisco, where the population is denser and where the wages and
table 3 .9 . Ethnicity of IHSS Providers, Los Angeles and San Francisco
Counties, December 2003
los  angeles  county san francisco county
Number of 
Workers
Percentage of
Workforce
Percent 
Family Providers
Number of
Workers 
Percentage of
Workforce
Percent 
Family Providers
Latino 28,542 26% 72% 1,068 9% 53%
Chinese 6,167 6% 72% 4,012 35% 68%
Russian 2,726 3% 47% 2,597 23% 37%
Armenian 11,521 11% 75% 7 0% —
African American 22,086 20% 60% 1,411 12% 61%
White 23,416 22% 62% 1,290 11% 48%
Filipino 3,551 3% 87% 477 4% 80%
Vietnamese 2,034 2% 89% 200 2% 84%
Other Asian 6,224 6% 79% 274 2% 73%
Other 2,514 2% 74% 179 2% 67%
Total 108,781 100% 68% 11,515 100% 57%
source :  CDSS n.d.
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beneWts are so much higher. The lower proportion of family providers in San Fran-
cisco, relative to Los Angeles, leads us to expect turnover to be higher, if other factors
are similar, whereas the greater representation of non-White and non-African Amer-
ican ethnic groups would lead us to expect turnover to be lower.
Table 3.10 shows the average hours worked per month by providers in Los Angeles
and San Francisco counties. On average, workers in Los Angeles worked 8.6 more
hours per month than did workers in San Francisco, and, on average, nonfamily
providers worked almost thirteen more hours in Los Angeles than in San Francisco.
Except for Latinos and Filipinos, nonfamily providers in all ethnic groups worked
substantially more hours in Los Angeles, again suggesting some underlying, noncul-
tural determining factor. Family providers, on the other hand, do not seem to be
aVected by some common factor, since some ethnic groups—Chinese, Russians, and
Vietnamese—worked more hours in Los Angeles while others worked fewer or sim-
ilar hours on average. Providers in Los Angeles also worked for more consumers, on
average, than did those in San Francisco (Table 3.11). This is true for both family and
nonfamily providers and for every ethnic group, with the exception of nonfamily
Latino providers.
There is a clear pattern at the state level of providers working for more consumers
in counties with lower wages. Providers in Los Angeles County did not work more
hours because their consumers were more impaired or had higher hours of authori-
zation. The average number of hours authorized each month per consumer in Los
table 3 . 10 . Average Hours Worked per IHSS Provider per Month, Los Angeles 
and San Francisco Counties, December 2003
los  angeles  county san francisco county
All
Providers
Nonfamily 
Providers
Family 
Providers
All 
Providers
Nonfamily
Providers
Family 
Providers
Latino 98.3 106.9 95.1 101.7 108.3 95.1
Chinese 86.6 103.1 81.2 80.9 92.9 76.2
Russian 123.1 138.0 111.9 87.8 88.8 83.5
Armenian 89.2 102.6 87.7 — — —
African American 95.6 99.6 93.8 94.4 95.9 93.6
White 107.6 110.3 107.6 102.3 95.2 111.8
Filipino 83.9 98.0 81.9 93.1 98.9 90.3
Vietnamese 88.9 97.0 88.6 70.3 91.1 67.2
Other Asian 93.9 108.4 90.9 94.1 90.3 95.4
Other 119.7 112.8 123.2 116.2 104.0 120.1
Total 98.4 106.6 95.4 89.8 94.0 86.5
source :  CDSS n.d.
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table 3 . 1 1 . Average Number of Consumers per IHSS Provider, Los Angeles 
and San Francisco Counties, December 2003
los  angeles  county san francisco county
All 
Providers
Nonfamily
Providers
Family
Providers
All 
Providers
Nonfamily 
Providers
Family 
Providers
Latino 1.19 1.35 1.13 1.21 1.35 1.10
Chinese 1.42 1.74 1.29 1.23 1.35 1.17
Russian 1.58 1.64 1.52 1.34 1.35 1.29
Armenian 1.48 1.54 1.46 — — —
African American 1.17 1.23 1.13 1.11 1.16 1.07
White 1.21 1.28 1.16 1.10 1.12 1.06
Filipino 1.21 1.43 1.18 1.15 1.33 1.08
Vietnamese 1.23 1.23 1.24 1.14 1.27 1.12
Other Asian 1.29 1.49 1.24 1.13 1.17 1.10
Other 1.09 1.15 1.07 1.06 1.07 1.04
Total 1.25 1.35 1.20 1.21 1.29 1.15
source :  CDSS n.d.
Angeles was 80, compared to 79 in San Francisco. Again, in the context of the entire
state, providers in low-wage counties worked more hours per month than did pro-
viders in high-wage counties, even when not justiWed by higher levels of hours
authorized for consumers. Finally, it may be the case that providers worked more
hours in Los Angeles because they needed to qualify for health insurance; but again,
the evidence from the state as a whole is that workers worked more hours in low-
wage counties. In sum, there is some evidence, based on descriptive statistics, that
workers in urban areas work more hours for more consumers when they are paid
lower wages.
Finally, we look at diVerences in turnover rates in the two counties to see what
eVect compensation diVerentials might have. Table 3.12 shows total turnover rates
and turnover rates adjusted to exclude providers who left simultaneously with their
consumers. Turnover in Los Angeles was 24%, just one point above turnover in San
Francisco. Los Angeles and San Francisco had roughly equal turnover rates for fam-
ily providers at 20% and 21%, respectively, but the turnover rate for nonfamily pro-
viders was considerably higher in Los Angeles: 31% compared to 26% in San
Francisco. Turnover for nonfamily providers was consistently higher for most ethnic
groups in Los Angeles, with the particularly notable exception of Whites. The
higher proportion of nonfamily providers in San Francisco pulls up the aggregate
turnover rate to the level of Los Angeles.
The pattern persists for adjusted turnover, as Figure 3.6 shows. The rate for all
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nonfamily providers was lower in San Francisco than it was in Los Angeles, and it
was lower in San Francisco for all ethnic groups except Whites and Filipinos. Again,
since turnover was lower for nonfamily providers among most ethnic groups in San
Francisco, relative to Los Angeles, and since it was similar to Los Angeles for family
providers across all ethnic groups, the diVerences in nonfamily turnover between San
Francisco and Los Angeles cannot be due to the eVect of aggregation. There is some
underlying causal factor that is reducing turnover in San Francisco among nonfam-
ily providers. Higher wages and better health insurance in San Francisco is the obvi-
ous explanation.
table 3 . 12 . Turnover among IHSS Providers, Los Angeles and San Francisco 
Counties, December 2002–December 2003
total  turnover adjusted turnover
All 
Providers
Nonfamily 
Providers
Family
Providers
All 
Providers
Nonfamily 
Providers
Family
Providers
Los Angeles County
Latino 24% 34% 20% 13% 22% 9%
Chinese 22% 28% 19% 14% 22% 11%
Russian 17% 20% 14% 14% 17% 11%
Armenian 15% 21% 12% 12% 17% 9%
African American 32% 38% 27% 18% 24% 14%
White 22% 26% 19% 12% 17% 8%
Filipino 26% 38% 24% 11% 24% 9%
Vietnamese 19% 29% 17% 11% 18% 10%
Other Asian 21% 30% 19% 11% 20% 8%
Other 19% 28% 16% 9% 15% 7%
Total 24% 31% 20% 18% 20% 10%
San Francisco County
Latino 25% 27% 24% 14% 17% 10%
Chinese 23% 27% 20% 14% 18% 12%
Russian 16% 18% 13% 12% 13% 10%
Armenian — — — — — —
African American 32% 37% 28% 17% 23% 13%
White 27% 30% 23% 13% 17% 9%
Filipino 27% 35% 24% 12% 25% 7%
Vietnamese 21% 31% 19% 12% 12% 13%
Other Asian 27% 39% 21% 11% 18% 7%
Other 15% 18% 13% 6% 7% 6%
Total 23% 26% 21% 14% 17% 11%
source :  CDSS n.d.
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Regression Analysis
Logit regression analysis is required to parse out the eVects of other deterministic
variables from the eVect of wages and beneWts on turnover. Although it is tempting
to do an analysis only of San Francisco and Los Angeles counties, there is not
enough variation in wages to get meaningful results. Current data availability con-
strains analysis of any counties beyond San Francisco to a cross-sectional analysis, in
which it is possible to control for some of the other sources of variation in turnover,
such as the ethnic mix of the workforce, the proportion of family providers, and
local labor market conditions, but not for others. It is not possible, for example, to
control for the impairment level of the population of consumers, which may vary
signiWcantly, implying variation in the relative diYculty of the job.24
I regressed the probability of any provider who was in the workforce in December
2002 and remained in the workforce for twelve months against a set of explanatory
variables: wages, beneWts, family relationship to consumer, the interaction between
family and wage, and whether health insurance was available. (See Appendix B for a
summary of the research design.) All these variables were included in the San Fran-
cisco study.
In the San Francisco study the health insurance variable simply measured the
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figure  3 .6 . Annual Turnover for IHSS Workers, by Ethnicity, Los Angeles 
and San Francisco, December 2002–December 2003
source:  CDSS n.d.
24. This study was designed to control for as much of the variation across regions as possible so
that the eVect of diVerent wage and beneWt levels can be measured. Nevertheless, results from
cross-sectional analysis are never as good as those from a time series simply because a cross-
sectional analysis explains less of the variation in the dependent variable. With time series
analysis most of the other variables that aVect turnover, such as family status of provider or
ethnicity, are held constant. The only other deterministic variable that is not reasonably con-
stant, conditions in the local labor market, can be easily controlled for by using time series
data on local employment levels.
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eVect of going from a condition in which no health insurance was available to a con-
dition in which health insurance was available to most providers. The design for the
state-level analysis was more complex since some counties (accounting for 21% of
the workforce) oVered no health insurance, other counties (66%) oVered it to
employees who worked at least sixty-Wve to eighty hours per month for two to three
consecutive months, and still others (12% of the workforce) oVered it to those who
worked at least twenty-Wve hours per month for two consecutive months. I included
two dummy variables to capture the eVect of health insurance: one measured
whether a provider was in a county that has any health insurance, and the second
measured whether a provider worked in a county with low eligibility requirements.
I added several other variables that capture variation among regions rather than
individuals. To economize on the number of variables while still preserving the eVect
of diVering cultural norms and economic opportunities available to diVerent ethnic
groups, I included ethnic dummy variables. White is the omitted variable in this
group. To control for diVerences in the economic environment across regions, I
included a set of dummy variables for Wve county categories; here the Southern
Urban region was omitted. Two new variables were added: a measure of the number
of consumers served by each provider, and a variable measuring the number of hours
authorized to each provider, each measured in December 2002.25
As shown in Table 3.13, the logit regression analysis determined that the wage rate
variable is negative, supporting the hypothesis that as wages rise, turnover falls. In
contrast to the San Francisco study, the highly statistically signiWcant family coeY-
cient tells us that, other things being held equal, family providers are generally less
inclined to quit than are nonfamily providers, but that their decision to stay longer
is less aVected as the wage rises. The county category variables were all signiWcant
except the Southern Suburban and Coast category. The Southern Urban county cat-
egory was omitted; since this region is dominated by Los Angeles and San Diego
counties, the result for the Southern Suburban and Coast region tells us that eco-
nomic conditions there are similar to those in Los Angeles and San Diego counties.
The results for the other county categories indicate that underlying economic condi-
tions in those counties will cause turnover to be higher than it is in the Southern
Urban counties. The unemployment rate is higher for the rural counties than it is
for the southern urban counties, so this makes sense.26 Whether a county has health
insurance is not a statistically signiWcant variable, but whether a county has low eli-
gibility health insurance is. The results indicate that turnover falls as the number of
consumers per provider rises and also as the number of hours the provider is autho-
rized to work increases. Both results are unsurprising. And, as the San Francisco
25. The estimated coeYcients on the wage rate, the family provider dummy, and the family3wage
interactive are all highly statistically signiWcant.
26. I admit to being perplexed about why the Northern Urban and Suburban counties would
have higher turnover than those in the south after controlling for all other factors.
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study showed, being Russian reduces the likelihood of turnover, while being African
American increases it.
CONCLUSION
Home care as an occupation in California has changed dramatically over the past
Wfty years. By the 1990s there were at least 2 million people providing home care
nationwide and almost 300,000 working as home care providers in California. The
enormous growth in the occupation did not make it a good job. That required
greater resources and the political clout to translate those resources into better wages
and beneWts. Political power was realized only when a successful consumer-labor
table 3 . 13 . Probability of an IHSS Provider Quitting within a Year, California, 
December 2002–December 2003
Estimated 
CoeYcienta
Standard 
Error
Z
Statistic BIC a Mean
Marginal
Probability
Wage rate 20.079**** 0.012 26.6 39.6 7.863 20.009
Family provider 21.417**** 0.083 217.2 291.5 0.683 20.164
Wage3family 0.056**** 0.010 5.4 25.8 5.364 0.007
Northern Urban counties 0.491**** 0.034 14.6 209.5 0.153 0.057
Northern Suburban and Coast counties 0.417**** 0.033 12.7 158.5 0.071 0.048
Southern Suburban and Coast counties 0.050* 0.024 2.1 0.9 0.112 0.006
Rural Mountain and Coast counties 0.569**** 0.028 20.3 408.5 0.092 0.066
Rural Agricultural counties 0.365**** 0.023 15.8 245.1 0.075 0.042
Health insurance 0.040* 0.020 2.0 0.3 0.788 0.005
Good health insurance 20.182**** 0.027 26.6 40.6 0.121 20.021
Number of consumers to provider 20.313**** 0.014 222.3 495.5 1.213 20.036
Number of hours per month 20.002**** 0.000 224.5 596.7 103.224 0.000
Latino 20.009 0.017 20.5 23.2 0.204 20.001
Chinese 20.019 0.033 20.6 23.2 0.041 20.002
Russian 20.244**** 0.043 25.7 28.5 0.024 20.028
Armenian 20.049 0.038 21.3 21.9 0.036 20.006
African American 0.291**** 0.018 15.9 250.5 0.132 0.034
Other 20.070*** 0.020 23.4 8.1 0.128 20.008
Constant 20.170 0.096 21.8 20.4 1.000
Probability of turnover at mean of all 
independent variables 0.135
N 244,074
pseudo R2 0.047
source : CDSS n.d.
a * 0–2: weak; ** 2–6: positive; *** 6–10: strong; **** 101: very strong.
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coalition was formed in the early 1990s to Wght for the resources and the institu-
tional changes that improved the quality of consumer-directed services. The coali-
tion successfully lobbied to revise state laws governing the IHSS program. Under
the new law, an IHSS public authority could be formed in each county to serve as
the employer of record and to provide referral services and training for consumers
and providers. In 2004, more than a year after all California counties were mandated
to establish an employer of record, and at a time when most counties have chosen to
create public authorities, approximately thirteen pay wages above $9 an hour, and
most of those oVer some level of employer-based health insurance.
What the research presented in this chapter and previous work suggests is that the
creation of public authorities resolved many of the problems in the IHSS program
that were identiWed by the Little Hoover Commission in 1991 and that unionization
has allowed home care workers to bargain for higher wages and beneWts.
Home care is among the top six fastest growing occupations in the United States.
Nationwide, home care workers are paid, on average, $8 an hour. These low wages
and the lack of beneWts are a big part of why there is a severe shortage of home care
workers in the United States. Solving the problem of low-wage work (Appelbaum et
al. 2004) and alleviating the shortage of direct care workers require the interest and
intervention of the federal government. If Congress were to raise the minimum
wage, at least to the same real value it had at its peak in 1979, which would be about
$7.00 in 2004 dollars, and if the NLRB enforced U.S. labor law, the wage Xoor
could rise to the real value of the minimum wage twenty-Wve years ago. At least
some of the direct care worker shortage would be mitigated by higher wages and
employer-provided health insurance, especially for part-time jobs. Home care is a
particularly strategic occupation, however, not the least because it represents such a
large share of the low-wage workforce. The vast majority of home care services are
funded by Medicaid (PHI 2003), which means not only that state and federal gov-
ernments establish a Xoor for wages but also that, to a large extent, they pay the
wages. Unlike the private employers in manufacturing, retail, and services, which
also pay very low wages, state and federal governments are subject to direct political
pressure from unions and consumer groups, often working in coalition.
California is possibly the most important venue in which such political action
and union organizing has helped transform low-wage home care jobs into better
jobs with beneWts. Indeed, if home care jobs, which represent one in every ten low-
wage jobs, pay a living wage with beneWts, even for part-time work, other low-wage
jobs employing the same pool of workers may beneWt from a spillover eVect. Cali-
fornia, if only in some counties, is beginning to deWne a strategy that will remedy
critical shortages and, at the same time, potentially deWne a new standard for low-
wage, and especially part-time, jobs—one that makes it possible for low-wage
workers to rise above the poverty line. But like many good ideas, the outcome of
this experiment still depends on federal, state, and local Wnancing and the politics
behind it.
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APPENDIX A.  Variables Included in Logit Regression Model of Workforce 
Retention for San Francisco County
Variable Definition
Sample 
Average a SD
Dependent Variable
Retention rate Probability that a new worker will remain 
for a year after entry
0.68 0.46
Independent Variables
Wage rate Wage rate at time t $8.85 1.573
Family provider 1 if provider i is related to consumer;
0 if otherwise
0.495 0.500
Wage3family Wage rate at time t3family for individual 
i at time t; 0 if otherwise
4.487 4.648
Health insurance 1 if there is health insurance available to 
all providers at time t; 0 if otherwise
0.818 0.386
Dental insurance 1 if there is dental insurance available to 
all providers at time t; 0 if otherwise
0.713 0.452
San Francisco
employment
Employment in San Francisco county 
at time t (000s)
406.9 11.991
a Means are for total new providers in workforce from December 1997 to February 2002.
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APPENDIX B.  Variables Included in Logit Regression Model of Workforce 
Turnover for California
Variable Definition
Sample
Average a SD
Dependent Variable
Turnover rate Probability that a worker will not be in 
workforce 1 year after 12/02
0.148 0.355
Independent Variables
Wage rate Wage rate in county j $7.86 1.11
Family provider 1 if provider i is related to consumer;
0 if otherwise
0.683 0.46
Wage3family Wage rate in county j3family for individual 
i in county j; 0 if otherwise
5.364 3.76
Health insurance 1 if there is any health insurance available 
to individual i in county j; 0 if otherwise
0.788 0.40
Good health insurance 1 if individual i elig for HI after ,35 hrs
work/month in county j; 0 if otherwise
0.121 0.33
Number of consumers 
to provider
Number of consumers cared for by provider
i in Dec 2003; 0 if otherwise
1.213 0.452
Number of provider 
hours per month
Number of work hours authorized to 
provider i for Dec 2003
103.2 71.1
County category 1 if individual i lives in County Category j;
0 if otherwise
Southern Urban is omitted category
Ethnic category 1 if provider i is member of ethnic category j;
0 if otherwise
White is omitted category
a Means are for total workforce in California in December 2002.
